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I. TNTRODUCTION
Increasing malicious network traffic, such as denial-ofservice (DOS) floods, worms and other forms, have become serious threats to the network security. Network traffic monitoring and analysis tools are being employed to counter this threat. If efficient visual and analysis tools are available to network administrators, it could become possible to detect the attacks, anomalies and to appropriately take action to suppress the attacks before they have had much time to propagate across the network. We study the possibilities of traffic-analysis based visual mechanism for attack detection and identification.
To studv and classify traffic on the network based on usage and protocoIs, a number of tools such as FlocvScan [SI, Cisco's FlowAnalyzer, and AutoFocus [l] , are used as traffic analyzers. Some of these tools provide real-time reporting capability, but much of the analysis is done off-line. These kook have been effectively utilized for traffic engineering and post-mortem anomaly detection. However, rigorous real-time analysis is needed for detecting and identifiing the anomalies so that mitigation action can be t&en as promptly as possible. Some of these tools are based on the volume of traffic such as byte counts and packet counts. When links are congested, it is possible to always observe a fully utilized link without giving further information about possible changes in network traffic. Sophisticated Iow-rate attacks [2] and replacement attacks, wluch don't give rise to noticeable variance in traffic volume, could go undetected when only traffic volume is considered. The tools that collect and process flow data may not scale to high-speed links as they focus on individual flow behavior. Our approach tnes to look at aggegate packet header data in order to improve scalability. Our work here brings techniques from image processing and video analysis to visualization and realtime analysis of traffic patterns.
Our approach passivel? monitors packet headers of network traffic at regular intends and generates image of this packet header data. These images are analyzed to find whether any abnormalities are observed in the traffic. Recent studies have shown that the traffic can have strong pattems of behavior over several timescales [3] , and our previous work has shown the possibility of analysis of wide-sense stationary (WSS) propert! in network traffic [4] . Recent work in [7] has shown that Gaussian approximation could work well for aggregated traffic. Self-propagating and automated malicious codes perturb normal network traffic patterns in general. By observing the traffic and correlating it ta the previous normal states of traffic, it may be possible to see whether the current traffic is behaving in an anomalous manner. In case of anomalous traffic such as flash crowds and DOS attacks, the usage pattern of network may be changed and peculiarities could be represented in visual images. When anomalies are detected, further analysis can characterize the anomalies by their nature into several categories (random attack, targeted attack, multi-source attack, portscan attack etc.) and help i n mitigating the attacks.
In ths paper, we will report our measurements conducted on real traces of traffic at three major networks. This paper will make the following signifcant contributions: (a) employing packet header data as images for traffic visualization, (b) employing image processing and compression techniques for efficiently storing and processing such visual data and (c) on the effectiveness of such measures in detecting and identifying the attacks in real-time w i t h v e v small latencies.
II. RELATEDWORK
time series of a single variable, our work here tries to analFze distributions over different domains of packet header data, particulady tlu: address space and port number space. Our work also brings the tools from image processing and video analysis to traffic analysis. 
III. OUR APPROACH
We employ packet header data collected at a network access point for M i c analysis. This data includes source/destination addresses, port numbers, traffic volume in bytes. packets and other useful information. Each sample of data is represented as an image. For example. a pixel in such an image may represent W i c volume originating from each source address. Similarly, the iinage may represent M i c volume in bytes or packets going to a destination or the traffic between a (source, destination) pair. Similarly, the image may represent the port numbers Seen during the sample. The image m y represent the number of port numbers or flows seen between a (source. destination) pair.
Such a representation allows simple visualization of traffic data as each sample is seen as a frame in a video sequence.
Traffic data can then be efficiently stored through such techniques as video compression. Multiple pieces of data can be represented as different colors of an image leading to uniform treatment and analysis.
Image processing and video analysis techniques can be applied to such a representation to decipher pattems of traffic.
Scene change analysis could reveal sudden changes in traffic patterns leading to traffic anomaly detection. Under some attacks (as seen with recent semi-random worm attacks). attacking multiple destinations will be represented by horizontal lines in the (source. destination) t&ic yolume image. Similarly, a Distributed DOS attack against a single destination would be represented by vertical lines in the (source, destination) image. A portscan attack would be similarly visible in the port number based images.
Netviewer consists of three major components as shown in Fig. 1 , The first step consists of t f l i c signal generation in which the iinage signal is generated fmm samples of network traffic. Packet header traces or NetFlow records may be used as described in sections 4.5 and 7. 
Traces
To v e m the validity of our approach, we run Netviewer on three kinds of real M i c traces.
First, we emmine the tool on traces from the Universily of Southern California (USC) [14] , which contains real network attacks in the pcap header format. Additionally to inspect the sensitivity of our tool on backbone liinks, we examine the tool on KREONet2 traces from Oct. 12, 2003 A study of required parameters for presenting network traffic as images like the number of DCT coefficients retained and sampling rate will be evaluated in the future work. To model the distribution of M i c , we select only ambient trace, free of attacks. as samples and look at some statistical properties. Fig. 3 shows the histogram and normal probability plot of the variations of 4*1 DCT coefficients based on the ambient KREONet2 traces. And we verify normality of these 2-week data through the Lilliefors test for goodness of fit to a normal distribution with unspecfkd mean and variance. Suppose X(t) (Y(t)) is a random process defined by standard deviation of the 4*4 DCT coefficients of the source (destination) address images. TIE variance data have a normal distribution at 5% sigruficance level, namely X-N(24&Ot 502) in source addresses and Y-N(2265, 50') in destination addresses. When random variable X(t) possesses mean p and variance $. the probability density function (pdf) can be expressed as folIows. 
Thresholds Setting through Statistical Analysis
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We set 2 kmds of thresholds. which are the high threshold TH indicating the traffic is heterogeneously distributed abnormally and the low threshold TL signifying the network is inordinately homogeneously distributed. We can judge the current traffic status by calculating the standard intensity deviation of the 4*4 DCT coefticients of each frame as (5).
w o z c status normal.
When we set the TH and TL thresholds to k 3 . 0 0 respectively, these figures of about 2330 and 2630 in source I P address and of about 2123 and 2408 in destination Ip address correspond to zk3.00 confdence interval €or random process x and Y.
This interval matches 99.7% confidence level by (6). With such thresholds. we can detect attacks with e m r rate of 0.3%. which can be expected as target false alarm rates.
V. ANOMALY DETECTION USING SCENE CHANGE ANALYSIS
Self-propagating and automated malicious codes usually d i a d normal network usage patterns. By observing the traffic and correlating it to the normal states, we can judge if the current traffic is operating in a normal manner. In the case of abnormal traffic. the traffic pattern of network may change and these changes could be exhibited in the visual images.
Automated attacks codd be generally classified by their convergence to the destination into (i) a single target. (ii) semirandom targets (subnet and other prefis-based attacks). and (iii) random targets. Single target attack can be considered as a special case of a semi-random target case. We look generally at traffic as in normal behavior mode. in semi-random and in random attack modes. Fig. 1 shows the vtsual measurement of P,, of the source/destination IF' addresses in normal traffic state based on a portion of the KREONet2 tmces. The Fig, 4 (a) and 4@) subpictures show the standard deviation of 1*4 DCT coefficients (by (3)) after DCT in source/destination addresses respectively.
Visual patterns in normal network traffic
The lower 3 sub-pictures visually illustrate the normalized packet counts as outlined in Fig. 2 . The aggregate traffic does not form any regular shape due to dispersibility of traffic of various and numerous flows in time and space. The color and darkness of each pixel point up the intensity of traffic of corresponding P address. During normal M i c . the standard deviations of DCT of traffic frames maintain the middle level between the two anomalous cases in the Fig. 4(a) and 4(b) as set in (5). 
Visual
5.1.3
Fig . 6 shows the traffic during a (horizontal) random attack. From Fig. 6 (e), it shows that two specific sources, i.e., hi" attackers (visible through black pixels in Fig. 6 (c) and horizontal lines in 6(e)), scan all possible destinations. We categorize random attacks into two types.
Horizontal scan -is a scan from the same source P address aimed at multiple target addresses. It is also known as strobe scan (or worm propagation) wluch is intended to probe various vulnerabihties of unspecified recipients.
Vertical scan -is defined as a sequential or mrulom scan from several machines (in a subnet) to a single destination address. Attackers are likely staging DDoS against a speclfic machne.
Visual patterns in random targeted attacks .
5.1.4
Visual patterns in complicated attacks We illustrate complicated and mixed attack pattems using USC traces in Fig. 7 . Between the 7* and the 25* frames. randomly generated source addresses attack specific destination addresses. Moreover: from Fig. 7 (c) and 7(e), we can infer that a few specific source addresses lead the attack. That is, the horizontal (dotted or solid) line in Fig. 7 (e) means specific source scans destination addresses randomly; on the other land, the vertical line implies mndomly generated sources assail specific destination address. This particular trace has a combination of attacks, i.e., a type of worm and DDos, resulting in inultiple indications of possible anomalies.
In actual implementation Netviewer offers these visual measurements as a real-time motion picture. It could help the nehvork operators recognize the traffic transition trends. 
Anomaly detection
If the variance within frame in curreIlt sampling instance is above the TH or below the TL. we consider that an anomaly is detected at the sampling point as set in (5). The real-time detection requires that the analysis and the detection mechanism rely on small datasets in order to keep such on-line analysis feasible. Our detection signal can be calculated instantaneously at the sampling instants. Results from real trace-dnven evaluation for 8 days are shown in the top 2 subpictures of the 
Attack estimation using motion prediction
During some attacks. a concentrated attack is circulated on the address space in a semi-random fashion. A semi-mdom targeted attack could be observed when i) W i c is actually concentrated on a (aggregated) single destination or a subnet, ii) random targeted attacks which l w e longer period than sa~npling duration are staged. Using motion prediction, it is possible to expect or anticipate the EX? set of target addresses in such attacks. We estimate the locations of the nexl attack using modified imtion prediction scheme as explained in the following 3 steps. Fig. 9 illustrates the intermediate results in each sequence based on the destination IP address of the 25*' frame in Fig. 3(d) .
The 1' ' step is the complexity reduction To reduce the subject of investigation, the pixels falling into the following constraints can be excluded from consideration range. By considering only the non-filtered pixels from this preprocessing phase, we can eficienrly improve the searching time, avoiding the exhaustive and brute force search of entire address space.
Pis& below a mean packet count. The change in packet counts is remarkabfe between adjacent pixels using the following nomiallzed absolute dference (?LAD) similarity measure. In the 2nd stage: to find a block of addresses. a continuity check is carried out. For improving the continuity, a few noncontinuous pixels between continuous pixels, which results from the aperture problem are considered as a portion of the continuous block. The aperture pmbIem appears in situations where' the objects of interest haF-e uniform color. The blocks which are inside the objects do not appear as moving because all of the blocks around them have same color. As a result, the size of the attackinglattacked area can be estimated. In classical image processing, the predefined block size is usually utilized for matching [13] . However. in our method, flexible block size is more desirable due to uncertainty of attack address range.
In the 3rd step, to calculate the quantitative components, the starting positions of attack area and motion vectors for object tracking are cdculated. The result of the matching operation is a motion vector with the length of the distance between the positions of the blocks in two consecutive frames. The next potential attack ranges are estimated based on the starting positions and the motion vector length. If the estimation error behveen the estinxited area and the actual area is generated, we could compensate the motion vector.
The results from such an analysis on a semi-random attack are shown in Fig. 9 . Fig. 9(a) shows the non-filtered pixels from the complesity reduction with starting pixel data and Fig.  9(b) shows the identified block of addresses. Fig. 9(c) shows the result of motion prediction (in red pixels) indicating the next set of addresses that may be a target of this attack. Fig.  9(d) is the actual traffic data for the next sampling paint. validating the utility of such motion prediction techques.
Processing and memory complexity
Our work requires two samples of packet header data 2*P, where P is the size of the sample data, We also maintain summaq information (DCT coefficients etc.) over a larger number of samples S. for statistical evaluation of the current data sample. So, the total space requirement is O(P+S). In our
.. 
DCT based image analysis requires O(P+S) processing.
These requirements are sufficiently small that the proposed approach can be implemented in real-time. Sampling periods can be nude larger to accommodate available resources. For example, the address analysis requires about 258Kbytes (1K for source/destimtion domain each and 256K for 2-dim (source, destination) domain) of memo?. which can be accommodated in SRAM. For We define delta as the difference of normalized packet counts by (9).
Correlation is calculated by (81, possession ratio by (2). and delta by (9) . Delta is remarkable at the instant of beginning and ending of attacks. Corretation of each pixel would have probability of (1/256)' in case of perfectly uniform distribution, We set 3.8% as correlation thresholds, whch means the corresponding LP address successively send packets 50 times as many as the evenly distributed address in the average. Once an attack candidate is identified by correlation the possession rate and delta ascertain the suspicious byte. We continue this identification process to locate the address responsible for the anomalies over the four byte-segment levels independently as shown in the upper part of Fig. 10. "S" recorded in the last column indicates black listing which is successively identified and refined over recent sampling instances. It could help network operators make a final decision.
Identification of attackers' a n d victims' entire IP address
Because our data structure processes each byte of the P address independently, it needs to concatenate the identified entnes in each byte into 4-byte whole IP address as shown in Appendis A-2.
First, along with our image data representation we employ 4 independent hash functions, hl, hZ. h3, h,, each with range { 1: .. .. m ] as a Bloom filter [22] . For each IP address U,,, in the sampling interval, the bits at positions hl{u,,J. hz(a,J: h3 (a,,Ji, h4(q,J in bit vector are set to ' 1 '. Second, for the concatenation of suspicious IP address bytes (to form the complete &byte address), we choose the identified most s i m c a n t bytes of some (destination) IP addresses. We employ the E-vicinity method in which the two neighboring bytes are concatenated if the measureinent difference of the two bytes is less than the tolerable error range. This concatenation procedure continues to the 4* bjle. ?Turd we reduce the false positive rates of the generated +byte I P addresses by querying the membershp of the addresses through aforementioned Bloom filter data.
Through this concatenation, the source and destination addresses of attacks could be identified as shown in the lower part of Fig. 10 .
Based on identified attackers and victims, our mechanism can automatically attempt to mitigate the carresponding flows. ..****.. For privacy, the IP addresses in Fig. 10 are appropriaretysanitized.
VII. MULTIDIMENSIONAL VISUALIZATION
Up to now, we have focused on normalized packet counts in tlie address domin. Besides normalized packet counts, we can use the number of flows and the correlation of the normalized packet counts over the address space for anavzing a variety of aspects of traffic_ independently or jointly.-The various pieces of data can be represented as different components (for example, Y. U, V) of an image or dlfferenr primay colors (R G, B ).
An analysis of the flow based component of the image is effective for revealing portscan types of attacks. When a flow is defined as the triple of (source address, destination address, destination port). portscan attacks increase the number of flows. when scanning multiple destination pons. The nonnalized hstribution of the number of flows would be much different from its normal activie.
An analysis of the correlation based image gves an idea of continuance over specific address space. Correlation by (8) informs us of flash crowds as well as attacks.
We develop a multi-component image based analysis of traffic data The visualization of uaffic data with multiple components requires some careful consideration of colors for different pieces of traffic data. 
Visual patterns in port number domain
So far, we lave exploited the packet header information such as normalized packet counts. the number of flows and the correlation, within the address domain. We could analvze and visualize the packet header information in other domains, for example, the port number domain.
An analysis of the port number based component of the image can reveal portscan @pes of attacks. When a machine is the target of a portscan tlie distribution of the eqdoited port numbers would be different from its normal distribution.
As an illustrative example, using the normalized packet counts, Fig. 12 shows the visual measurement of P, in the murceldestination port number domain for detecting portscans. (i) Noise only, €&: represents the null hypothesis or the nonnal network traffic. The probability densi& under Ho is represented by P(s = -r j~, ) = P(.rJHo).
(U) Signal with noise. Hi: represents the alternative hypothesis or anomalous network activity, i.e., the tlaffic contains the attacWflash crowd. The probability m s s under HI is represented by
We want to develop an algorithm to choose between & and HI and minimize the probability of error.
Probability density function of H, and HI
(1-2) in destination as follows. These critical regions are close to those of 3 0 in (6). Results h m real tmce-driven evaluation for 8 days are shown in the top 2 sub-pictures of the Fig. 8 . The magenta dots located on the top are marked when the NP detector declares anomalies.
The 3cr method and NP detector achieve almost equivalent detection performance as shown in Fig. 8 
IX. COMPARISON WITH IDS
Intrusion detection system
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is an important part of network security anAitecture and signaturc detection based monitoring of network tmfiic for predefined suspicious activity or patterns is being widely deployed by network administrators. This detection principle relies on the availability of established rules of the anomalous or suspicious network traffic activity. To cope with new attacks. IDS tools are required to be updated with the latest rules. Currently there are a few available freeware/ shareware and commercial IDS tools.
Snort
We After the basic configuration is performed, we tum on the IDS rules, and begin to monitor the Analysis Console for Intrusion Databases (ACID) 1211.
Overalt results of Snort and Netviewet
Snort system reported 13,257 alerts distributed over the experiment time period as shown in Appendis A-4. Results from Netviewer based OR normalized packet counts are shown in the top 2 sub-pictures in Appendix A-5. In the trace. it is apparent that there are continuous anomalies over almost the entire time period. This detection result agrees uith that of Snort.
Comparison of Snort and Netviewer
Both Snort and NetViewer detect suspicious anomalies throughout the course of the trace capture. The detection performance can be considered at a similar level.
However, Snort's identification mechanism is superior in granularity. When coupled with a meclnnism such as ACID. Snort can mofe readily identifv the source of malicious activity, and what exactly that activity consists of. Snort provides an easily managed display of IP addresses and port numbers of a? suspicious activity. On the other hand. when Netviewer performs the analysis, it reports the suspicious IP addresses and the pattern of abnormality in an aggregated fashion Snort employs a qualitative analysis and Netviewer employs a quantitative analysis. During our evaluation, Snort missed the identification of many hea\y traffic sources. Some flows, using the BitTorrent system run by one of the users of the network accounted for about 30% to 60% traffic over certain time periods. However, without the operational rule, Snort did not detect tlus flow during its life period. However, Netviewer identified this flow as an anomalous event. This demonstrates the utility of measurement based approaches in detecting previously unknown or undocumented anomalous behavior.
Regarding the computational complexity+ Snort looks at the payload of packet as well as the packet header. And currently over 2.400 filter rules are established [20] . Netviewer works on aggregated information from traffic samples. Snort would require more computing resources to be able to match Netviewer performance against heay traffic.
From these above obsexations, we feel the two methods could be combined to provide a more complete detection system capable of detecting a wide array of different network security violations.
X. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
In ths paper. we have presented an approach which represents traffic data as images or frames at each sampling point. Such an approach enabled us to view traffic data as a sequence of frames or video and allowed us to apply various image processing and video analysis techniques for studying MIC patterns. We have demonstrated our approach through an analysis of traffic traces obtained at three major networks. Our results show that our approach leads to useful traffic visualization and analysis. We have studied detection and identification approaches along multiple dimensions of Ip packet header data such as addresses. port numbers, a d the number of flows.
We compared our statistical approach with classical NP-test from detection theoy to evaluate the effectiveness of different traffic signals. We also compared our approach with a signatureaased IDS system Our results indicate that measurement based statistical approaches can be simple and effective and could be combined with IDS approaches to enable more effective monitoring of network traffic.
We plan to study the effectiveness and quantitative evaluation of the image-bawl analysis of traffic with merent packet header data and in diverse networks. We plan to develop a network processor based system for testing the practical feasibility of our approach, plan to release our tool to general public and combine it with an LDS tool such as Snort in the fiIture. 
